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THE CHARACTER COMPONENT OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
LAWS: A CONTINUING BARRIER TO THE
EX-FELON'S EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
BRUCE

I.

E. MAY*

INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s this nation became addicted to imprisonment as a
primary way of dealing with social problems and unlawful conduct. 1
The addiction has not changed in the 1990s. United States citizens are
becoming increasingly frustrated by crime and violence and are looking
to increased sentences and long-term imprisonment as a solution to their
frustration .2
Policymakers in the United States must create and adopt rational
strategies not only to protect society but also to reduce the number of
prison inmates. 3 Spending on corrections is the fastest growing item in
state budgets. 4 Recidivists or repeat offenders constitute a large proportion of the prison population. 5 Reducing recidivism can operate to
reduce the overall prison population thereby reducing the burdens on
state and federal budgets.
Imprisonment as a method to reduce recidivism has not been
effective. 6 However, facilitating employment opportunities for ex-felons
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of South Dakota; B.S., University of
Wisconsin, 1971; D.B.A., United States International University, 1981; J.D., University of San Diego,
1984. The author is a member of the California and Minnesota bars. Funding for this article was
provided in part by a University of South Dakota Faculty Development Grant.
1. See David C. Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FoRDtHAM URB. LJ. 641, 642
(1993) (discussing the numerous adverse consequences of this nation's addiction to prisons, such as the
financial burden to taxpayers, and arguing that if policymakers changed their vision and implemented
constructive reforms, they could conquer an addiction that is wasting lives and billions of dollars).
2. For example, in 1994 "three strikes, you're out" legislation or similar proposals have emerged
in approximately 30 states. Howard Buskirk, CaliforniaPasses a Tough Three-Strikes-You're Out Law,
CRIM. JUST. NEwSL., April 4, 1994, at 6. Three-strikes provisions generally mandate life imprisonment
for offenders convicted of a serious felony 'if they had two or more prior convictions for such
offenses. Id. California's three-strikes law went into effect on March 7, 1994. Id. A three-strikes
provision is also part of the federal "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994" signed
into law by President Clinton on September 13, 1994. 55 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2305, 2365 (1994).
3. The nation's state and federal prison population rose 7.4% in 1993, reaching a record high of
948,881 inmates, nearly triple the level of 1980. PrisonPopulationReached New High of 948,881 Last
Year, CRsM. JUST. NEWSL., June 1, 1994, at 6. As of December 31, 1993, overcrowding was estimated
at between 18% and 29% above capacity in state prisons and 36% over capacity in federal institutions.
Id.
4. State spending on prisons increased 7.7% in the 1995 fiscal year (which most states began on
July 1) compared to the year before. States Report Correctionsis Fastest-GrowingBudget Item, CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL., August 1, 1994, at 5. Prison spending between the fiscal year 1993 and 1994 grew by
9.7%. Id.
5. Leven, supra note 1, at 642 n.9 (noting a "study of a sample of prisoners released in 1983 from
prisons in eleven states indicated that 62.5% were rearrested for a new felony or serious
misdemeanor, and 41.4% were returned to prison or jail").
6. Leven, supra note 1, at 642.
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may help to lower the recidivism rate. 7 Research indicates that the
availability of employment and involvement in crime are inversely
related. 8 A successful societal effort to decrease recidivism must couple
correctional programs with a system that makes available a wide variety
of employment opportunities to ex-felons upon release. 9
State occupational licensing laws can operate to reduce the availability of employment opportunities for ex-felons. The statutory
requirements for obtaining occupational licenses vary among the states
and according to the type of license. Many occupational licensing laws
contain a character component. Character components that are not
substantially or directly related to the type of licensed occupation
prevent ex-felons from pursuing gainful employment opportunities.
The lack of employment opportunities contributes to an increase in
recidivism.
This article examines state occupational licensing laws and the
impact these laws have on the ex-felon who desires to pursue a particular
business or occupation.lO Part II describes occupational licensing laws
and explores the nature of licensing and the ramifications of failing to
be licensed. Part III examines state occupational licensing lawsl and
develops an analytical framework of five categories of laws based on
.character components. The varying impact of each category on the exfelon's ability to obtain an occupational license is also described. The
extension of these laws to business forms, such as corporations, and the
constitutional ramifications of these laws are briefly explored. Finally,
Part IV suggests that in order to facilitate the employment of ex-felons
7. The author recognizes that recidivism is a complex problem comprised of multiple causes.
The purpose of this article, however, is to focus on one factor that influences the overall rate of
recidivism-employment opportunities.
8. Harold L. Votey, Employment, Age, Race & Crime: A Labor Theoretic Investigation, 7 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 123, 124-25 (1991) (reviewing the literature discussing the relationship
between employment and crime and determining through an empirical study that employment
opportunities can reduce the tendency to participate in crime). See also Donald R. Stacy, Limitations
on Denying Licensure to Ex-Offenders, 2 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1973) (noting that unemployment may
be one of the primary factors in the high rate of recidivism).
9. See Josephine R. Potuto, A Model Proposalto Avoid Ex-Offender Employment Discrimination,
41 OHIo ST. LJ. 77, 81 (1980) (focusing on anti-discrimination provision contained in the Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act). See also Jeffrey D. Meyers, Note, County of Milwaukee v. LIRC:
Levels of Abstraction and Employment DiscriminationBecause of Arrest or Conviction Record, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 891, 911 (1988) (reasoning that two basic policy concerns, rehabilitation via employment
and fear of recidivism, are in direct conflict). The availability of employment opportunities is of vital
importance to rehabilitation efforts. Id. However, placing a convicted offender in virtually any job
creates the risk that the ex-offender will use the job to engage in further criminal activity. Id.
10. Although the focus is on the ex-felon, much of the discussion also applies to the exmisdemeanant.
11. A comprehensive review of state occupational licensing laws is beyond the scope of this
article. For a comprehensive review of these laws see HUNT ET AL., LAWS, LICENSES AND THE
OF'EiNwER's R tGHT TO WORK, NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON 0 FFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 1973
(providing an in-depth review of state occupational licensing laws).
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and thereby reduce recidivism, states must undergo a review of their
licensing statutes and procedures with the dual goal of facilitating
employment for the ex-felon and protecting the safety, health, and
welfare of society.
II.

LICENSING LAWS

A. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our modern administrative state, the government controls valuable employment opportunities and benefits through its power to confer
licenses. 12 Ordinarily, the loss of government employment benefits is
not incorporated directly into a criminal defendant's sentence. 13 Rather,
the loss occurs collaterally such as through the denial or revocation of a
4
license.1
A license is a grant of permission' 5 in the nature of a special privilege entitling the licensees to do something they would not ordinarily be
entitled to do.16 Generally, a license is a means for the state to regulate
and tax privileges and occupations and the use and disposal of property,
but is not a contract 1 7 or property right.18
Licensing laws are generally classified into two types, revenueraising and regulatory.1 9 Both types impact an ex-felon intending to
start a business or enter an occupation. However, regulatory licenses in
the form of occupational licenses present the greatest barrier to the exfelon. An analysis of these licenses is the focus of this article.
Generally, the purpose of a revenue-raising license is simply to
raise revenue for the state.20 A state imposes a fee upon issuing the
license to a business or a profession under its power to tax. 2 1 Issuing a
12. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS LJ.
1325, 1337 n.56 (1991).
13. Id. at 1337.
14. Id.
15. Bray v. State, 244 N.W.2d 619,622 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
16. Margola Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 32 (Wash. 1993). See generally 51 Am. Jur.
2d Licenses and Permits § 1 (1970) (providing a general overview of license principles).
17. City of LaGrange v. Troup County Elec. Membership Corp., 408 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991). See generally 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 3 (1987) (noting that a license is not a property right).
18. Shady Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Canary, 316 N.E.2d 481,484 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
19. Regulatory licenses are sometimes referred to as "protective" or "competency" licenses.
See, e.g., Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370, 374 (Cal. 1991) (finding that the
purpose of regulatory licensing laws is to protect the public from incompetence and dishonesty).
20. Village of Mogadore v. Coe, 197 N.E.2d 570, 573 (1963) (quoting BoviER's LAW
DICtnONARY). See also S & P Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 672 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. App. 1983)
(distinguishing a tax from a fee in that taxes are for raising revenue and a fee is for regulation).
21. Richmond County Business Ass'n v. Richmond County, 165 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Ga. 1968)
(describing the distinction between a tax and a license).
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revenue-raising license is generally a routine procedure; an applicant
pays a fee and obtains a license.22 Generally, the state does not inquire
into the background or competence of the applicant. 2 3 As such, issuing
the license does not constitute a "stamp of approval" on the ability or
competency of the licensee.
The purpose of regulatory licenses [hereinafter "occupational
licenses"], however, is to protect the public interest by regulating certain
activities.24 A state's power to issue regulatory type licenses flows from
the state's police powers with regard to the protection of the health,
morals, and welfare of the public. 25 Under its police powers, the state has
the power to require a license as a prerequisite to engaging in a business,
occupation, vocation, trade, or calling. 26 Generally, the state's power,
however, does not extend to legitimate occupations or businesses which
27
do not involve a public interest.
An occupational license is the formal permission granted by a
governmental body, generally for a fee, to a person, firm, or corporation,
to legally pursue some occupation or to legally carry on some business.28 Modern occupational licensing laws regulate professional as well
as unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. 29 Typical examples of
occupations regulated are: ambulance drivers, billiard room employees,

22. The fee must, however, be reasonable. See Consol. City of Jacksonville v. Dusenberry, 362
So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that a $1000.00 occupational license fee for fortune
tellers, clairvoyants, and astrologists was not reasonable and therefore void).
23. A typical example of a revenue-raising license is a local business license that is granted upon
submitting a fee and does not require the applicant to demonstrate any level of training, experience, or
competence.
24. Ellestad v. Swayze, 130 P.2d 349, 353 (Wash. 1942) (determining that a state may impose
reasonable conditions on licenses to protect the public). Alexander v. Director, Dept. of Agriculture,
444 N.E.2d 811 (11. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that the primary purpose of the licensing trades is the
prevention of injury to the public).
25. Rabino v. Commonwealth, 450 A.2d 773, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (finding that licensure
can be imposed under the police power to protect health, safety, morals, and welfare and citing
Watson v. Morgland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910)). See generally 51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits § 14
(1970) (providing a general description of the states' police powers in issuing licenses).
26. Republic Entertainment, Inc. v. Clark County Liquor and Gaming Licensing Bd., 672 P.2d
634, 637 (Nev. 1983) (police power of state to license businesses is exclusively legislative, but the
power can be delegated to boards and commissions). See generally 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 5 (1987)
(indicating that this power may be imposed on any business or profession).
27. See, e.g., State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. .1949) (holding that licensing of
photographers was an unreasonable restriction of a harmless occupation and had no relation to the
public health, morals and safety). However, through the efforts of certain trade groups to obtain
legislation favorable to their economic positions some type of "public interest" can be found in most
occupations and trade callings. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 6, 10 (1976) (resulting proliferation of occupational licensing has been criticized as not
protecting the public but rather protecting the economic positions of certain occupations and in turn
adversely affecting occupational mobility and economic competition).
28. Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 407 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (La. 1981) (citing Ewell v. Bd of
Supervisors, 100 So. 2d 221 (La. 1958)).
29. Gellhorn, supra note 27.
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attorneys, physicians, pharmacists, nurses, barbers, embalmers, septic tank
cleaners, real estate professionals, accountants, contractors, and sellers of
alcoholic beverages.30
Occupational licenses generally are issued and revoked at the
discretion of a governmental agency. 3 1 The underlying statute that
grants the agency the power to issue licenses must be reasonable and
nonarbitrary in its terms and conditions and must not be in restraint of
trade. 32 Because the occupational license is a regulatory license designed to protect the public, the terms and conditions for issuing the
license must relate to the protection of the public good. 3 3
Occupational licensing laws typically contain two components, a
"competency component" 3 4 and a "character component." 35
Through training and education, ex-felons can acquire the necessary
competency to be licensed in a particular occupation. However, as
detailed in Part III, a felony conviction often prevents an ex-felon from
satisfying the "character" requirement for obtaining a license.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING A VALID OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE
A valid and proper occupational license is crucial to any individual
seeking to enter a regulated trade, business, or occupation. The lack of a
valid license has three important ramifications.
First, many state statutes impose penalties or fines for operating
without a proper license. 3 6 Statutes imposing penalties for noncompli30. See, HuNT ET AL., supra note 11, at A-I. See also The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1004 (1970) [hereinafter Collateral Consequences]. After
examining the wide array of occupations that must be licensed, one researcher commented that
virtually the only people who remain unlicensed in the United States are the clergy and university
professors, presumably because they are nowhere taken seriously. See Gellhom, supra note 27.
31. Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
the determination of what sanctions best serve statutory policies is committed to administrative
licensing agency's discretion). See generally 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 3 (1987) (providing information on
occupational licensure).
32. Brown v. McGarr, 774 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the qualifications placed on the
license of a professional must be reasonably related to the profession and attainable by reasonable
study or application); Hardin v. Croom, 157 S.W.2d 520, 521 (1942) (finding that the qualifications
must not be in restraint of trade). See generally 53 CJ.S. Licenses § 20 (1987).
33. Raymond W. Wineblad, PA. v. Dept. of Registrations & Education, 515 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (allowing a state to change requirements for a license so long as the requirements bear a
reasonable relationship to securing public health, safety, and welfare).
34. The competency component generally requires the applicant to demonstrate a certain level
of competence before the agency will issue a license. Competency may be demonstrated through a
variety of methods including education, experience, apprenticeships or other training, or by passing an
examination administered by the licensing authority.
35. In the exercise of its police power to protect the health, morals, and welfare of the public, the
state inquires into the moral character of the applicant.
36. The penalty may consist of an additional monetary liability, the amount of which is measured
by the amount of the unpaid tax or license fee. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 146 (West 1990)
(providing violations of licensing statutes and penalties for infractions).
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ance must be strictly construed, 37 must not be arbitrary or capricious,38
and the penalty must not be excessive. 39 Under some statutes an unlicensed person may also be liable to pay a specific rate of interest on
unpaid fees in addition to the fines and penalties.40 Fines and penalties
can have a significant financial impact on a newly established business.
Second, violations of licensing laws can constitute either administrative4 1 or even criminal offenses that may be classified as misdemeanors
or felonies. 42 Such a criminal violation could have substantial ramifications for an ex-felon on probation because the criminal offense could
constitute a violation of probation for which the ex-felon is returned to

prison.
Third, parties cannot enforce a contract if they were not properly
licensed at the time of entering into the contract. 4 3 The inability to
enforce a contract includes the inability to enforce payment for work or
services previously performed. 44 Without the ability to enforce a con37. Wilcox v. Safley, 766 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Ark. 1989).
38. Arkansas State Bd. of Cosmetology v. Roberts, 772 S.W. 2d 624 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989).
39. Hecker v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 499 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that a
fine of $4,550 imposed upon revocation of a process server's license was excessive and reducing the
fine to $500).
40. Lexington-Layette Urban County Gov't v. Abney, 748 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1988) (holding an
unlicensed person liable for penalties and interest on delinquent occupational license fees).
41. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 148 (West 1993) (using additional statutes in conjunction
with existing statutes for license violations).
42. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23301 (West 1985) (providing for misdemeanor and
felony charges for selling alcoholic beverages without a license). See generally 53 CJ.S. Licenses §
82 (1987) (discussing misdemeanor and felony classifications).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 181 (1973).
If a party is prohibited from doing an act because of his failure to comply with licensing,
registration or similar requirement, a promise in consideration of his doing that act or of
his promise to do it is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if
(a) the requirement has a regulatory purpose, and
(b) the interest in the enforcement of the promises is clearly outweighed by the public'
policy behind the requirement.
Id.
This rule only applies to the right of the unlicensed party to enforce the contract. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 181 cmt. d (1973).
44. See, e.g., Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark, 803 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1991) (stating that
an unlicensed subcontractor may not recover compensation for his work from either the owner of a
construction project or the general contractor). The inability to enforce a contract generally relates to
the failure to possess a regulatory rather than a revenue-raising license. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) cp
CoNTRACTS § 181 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1973).
A, an unlicensed broker, agrees to arrange a transaction for B, for which B promises to
pay A $1,000. A city ordinance requires persons arranging such transactions to be
licensed as a result of paying a fee, with no inquiry into competence or responsibility. A
arranges the transaction. Since the licensing requirement is designed merely to raise
revenue and does not have a regulatory purpose, enforcement of B's promise is not
precluded on grounds of public policy.
Id.
The general proposition that a person unlicensed under a revenue-raising license can nonetheless
recover compensation is found in real estate brokerage licensing statutes. A real estate broker who is
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tract, the unlicensed party has no recourse for the breach of the contract. 45
The ability to obtain an occupational license is vital to anyone
seeking to enter a regulated occupation. The ex-felon's ability to obtain
such a license is generally made more difficult when licensing statutes
contain character components because the these components often
operate to exclude ex-felons from obtaining licenses.
III. EXCLUSION OF EX-FELONS FROM OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSES
Occupational licensing restrictions on ex-felons are prevalent
nationwide. 46 Countless federal, state, and municipal laws single out the
ex-felon for possible exclusion from the majority of regulated occupations.47 In some states virtually the only "profession" open to an exfelon is that of burglar; the ex-felon is barred from other activities
because she or he is presumed to be a person of bad moral character,
regardless of the nature of the crime or its relevance to the intended
occupation .48
A definitive study of the prevalence and impact of offender employment restrictions was performed in the early 1970s when there was a
growing interest in correctional reform. 49 The study5 O disclosed 1,948
separate statutory provisions that affect the licensing of persons with an
arrest or conviction record.51 For example, forty-six states had statutory
restrictions impacting the licensing of ex-felons as barbers, twenty-six
jurisdictions denied a beautician license to an applicant convicted of a
felony, twenty-four jurisdictions denied a practical nurse license to
unlicensed under a pure revenue-raising statute is not precluded from recovering compensation. See,
e.g., D.L. Spillman, Jr., Annotation, Licensed Real-Estate Broker's Right to Compensation as Affected
by Lack of License on the Part of Partners,Co-adventurers, Employees, or Other Associates, 8 A.L.R.
3d 523, 526 (1966).
45. The general proposition that a person who is unlicensed under a regulatory license cannot
enforce a contract is generally limited to executory contracts. The cases generally hold that once an
unlicensed person has been paid in consideration for the performance of a contract, the payee is not
entitled to recover back the money paid on the ground the contract was illegal because of the lack of
the license. See, e.g., Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Recovery Back of Money Paid to Unlicensed
Person Required by Law to Have Occupational or Business License or Permit to Make Contract, 74
A.LR. 3d 637 (1976).
46. For a thorough explanation of various forms of disabilities imposed on the employment of exfelons see Collateral Consequences, supra note 30, at 1009-12. See also Note, Civil Disabilities of
Felons,53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967) [hereinafter Civil Disabilities].
47. See Collateral Consequences, supra note 30, at 1002-1003.
48. Gellhor, supra note 27, at 13.
49. HuNT ETAL., supra note 11.
50. The study is in need of a comprehensive update. However, the study is relied upon as there
is no other authority available.
51. The average number of provisions affecting ex-felons for each state was 39. The study
identified 307 occupations that required licenses by at least one state.
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anyone convicted of a felony, and ten jurisdictions had restrictions
impacting the licensing of ex-felons as hearing aid dealers. 52 The
restrictions and outright denials were based on the applicants' past
criminal convictions.
A.

THE

CHARACTER COMPONENT OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING

Occupational licensing laws have a significant impact on the ability
of an individual to pursue an occupational or business goal. The failure
to obtain a proper license may not only result in the imposition of civil
or criminal penalties, but may also preclude the ability to enforce a
contract. Occupational licensing statutes generally consist of two coma "competency" and "character" component. Although
ponents:
many ex-felons can fulfill the competency requirement of an occupational licensing law through training, experience, or education, the
character component creates a more difficult obstacle for ex-felons.
The two most prevalent grounds for excluding ex-felons from
obtaining occupational licenses on the basis of the character component
53
relate to "good moral character" and "conviction of a crime."
Under many licensing laws, the possession of a felony conviction is an
automatic disqualification. In other instances, the possession of a felony
conviction is evidence of the lack of moral or reputable character. In
still other instances, the possession of a felony conviction is an important
consideration only if the conviction involves moral turpitude or relates
somehow to the particular activity being licensed.

52. HUNT ET AL., supra note 11, at 9-12. Additional occupations in which states restricted former
offenders based on a criminal conviction or lack of moral character included: accountant, artificial
inseminator, architect, attorney, barber, real estate broker, chiropractor, dental hygienist, dentist,
embalmer, engineer, funeral director, insurance agent, nurse, optometrist, osteopath, pharmacist,
physical therapist, physician, psychologist, and veterinarian. Lesser known occupations included:
astrologer, babcock test operator, butcher, cigarette dealer, dry cleaner, finger weaver, fur dealer,
horseshoer, jockey, photographer, poultry technician, stevedore, taxidermist, tree surgeon, water
maker, vendor, and weather person. For a comprehensive listing see Hutr Er AL, supra note 11, at AI.
53. Collateral Consequences, supra note 30, at 1009-11. See also Civil Disabilities,supra note 46,
at 388.
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As a framework for analysis, this article classifies state occupational
licensing laws into five categories.5 4 These categories consist of licensing laws that:
(1) make a criminal conviction a bar to obtaining a license ("criminal conviction" statutes);
(2) require good moral character, good character, or moral character ("good moral character" statutes);
(3) require reputable character ("reputable character" statutes);
(4) require honest and trustworthy character ("honest and trustworthy" statutes);
(5) do not specify a character requirement ("no character component" statutes).
Generally, the application of these categories to occupational
licenses indicates that "criminal conviction" and "good moral character" statutes pose the greatest obstacle to the ex-felon's attempt to obtain
a license. The "reputable character" and "honest and trustworthy"
statutes provide somewhat less of an obstacle. 5 5 The "no character
component" statutes will not be discussed further as the lack of a
character component does not impact the ex-felon's ability to obtain the
license. Also, this review of licensing laws indicates that character components may differ from state to state and from occupation to occupation. This variation among states and occupations provides an opportunity for a type of "forum" and "occupation" shopping for an individual who may have difficulty meeting the character requirements in a
specific state or occupation.
1. Criminal Conviction Statutes
The greatest barriers to the ex-felon's job opportunities are those
occupational licensing statutes that categorically exclude an applicant
with a criminal conviction from obtaining a license. These statutes are of
two types: those that strictly impose an absolute bar and those that allow
54. Other researchers have divided the type into a fewer number of categories. See, e.g., Note,
New Approaches to Civil Disabilities of Ex-Offenders, 64 Ky. LJ. 382 (1976) (defining the types as:
(1)those which exclude persons convicted of certain specified crimes; (2) those which exclude
persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; and (3) those which exclude persons convicted
of felonies) [hereinafter New Approaches]. See also HuNT ET AL, supra note 11, at 5 (classifying the
prohibitions as: (1) Provisions which specifically refer to criminal offenses as grounds for denying a
license; (2) Provisions which phrase restrictions or requirements in such a manner as to give licensing
agencies wide discretion to refuse a license to an applicant, such as the requirement that the applicant
possess "good moral character"; and (3) provisions which bar licensing because of offenses involving
"moral turpitude").
55. However, good reputation and honest and trustworthy are more restrictive of the exmisdemeanant's rights because courts tend to find the conviction of a misdemeanor as evidence of bad
character. See New Approaches, supra note 54, at 389.

196

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 71:187

consideration of mitigating factors such as the time of conviction,
subsequent conduct, rehabilitation, and the nature of the past crime.5 6
Conviction statutes that impose the strict criminal conviction preclusion pose the greatest difficulty because they operate to automatically
disqualify an individual regardless of mitigating considerations. For
example, in Ohio a criminal conviction automatically barred an applicant
from obtaining a dance hall license.57 The applicant argued that despite
two felony convictions, he possessed the good moral character necessary
to operate a dance hall and obtain a license.5 8 Nonetheless, the court
determined that evidence of his good moral character was not relevant
because he possessed two felony convictions and the licensing authority
was simply following a rule that all felons are denied licenses. 5 9 To
obtain a liquor license in South Dakota, the applicant must "never"
have been convicted of a felony. 60 In South Dakota "never" means
"never." According to the South Dakota Attorney General, twenty
years of good moral character subsequent to a conviction of a felony
does not qualify a person for a liquor license.61
Some criminal conviction statutes, however, do take into account
mitigating considerations such as the length of time or subsequent good
conduct between a criminal conviction and a license application. Time
requirements vary between states and among types of licenses. For
example, an applicant for a practical nurse license in South Dakota is
automatically denied a license if the applicant had a felony conviction
within the last five years. 62 In Virginia, no racing horse licenses are
issued to applicants convicted of a felony or crime involving moral
turpitude within ten years prior to the date of application. 63 In Florida, a
person convicted of a felony within fifteen years before an application is
barred from obtaining an alcoholic beverage license.64 "Lapse of time"
and "subsequent good conduct" are also taken into consideration for a
Florida real estate license.65 These mitigating factors make it easier for
an ex-felon to obtain a license.
56. The nature of the crime includes considerations such as its seriousness and whether it was a
misdemeanor or felony.
57. Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that pursuant to
statute an applicant was automatically denied a dance hall license because he possessed two felony
convictions).
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 35-2-6.2 (1992).
61. 50 S.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 173 (1950).
62. SD. CODFMD LAWS ANN. § 36-9-49(2) (1992).
63. Abrams v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 263 SE.2d 103, 105 (W. Va. 1980) (citing W. VA.
CODE § 19-23-8(b)(3), and Rule 712 of the W. VA. RuLEs OF RACING).
64. 59 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 160 (1959).
65. FLA. STAT. § 475.17 (West Supp. 1995).
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Good Moral CharacterStatutes

Good moral character statutes present the second greatest barrier to
the ex-felon obtaining an occupational license. The primary difficulties
posed with good moral character statutes are twofold. First, the nature of
character is often amorphous thereby making statutory definitions of
good character ambiguous and difficult to apply.66 Second, despite the
legislative and judicial ambiguity of good moral character definitions,
one definition has been generally accepted by the courts and licensing
agencies: if a person has committed a crime, that person lacks the
requisite good character for a license.67
In the cases of ex-felons, lack of a workable definition or guideline
of good moral character is especially crucial for several reasons. First, a
good moral character requirement is common to many licensing statutes.
Second, without a reasonably clear legislative or judicial definition of
good moral character, licensing boards and agencies can easily rely on
the generally accepted definition. Third, equating a criminal conviction
with the lack of good moral character essentially converts the good
moral character statute into the previously discussed criminal conviction
statute which automatically bars an ex-felon from obtaining a license.
Further, without adequate guidelines, different licensing agencies
can apply varying interpretations of good character which can lead to
inconsistent application of the same licensing statutes. An examination
of good moral character statutes reveals the imprecise standards and the
struggles of legislatures and courts in attempting to arrive at a concrete
definition of the concept. 6 8
State legislatures have encountered great difficulty in defining the
good moral character requirement of a licensing statute. For instance, in
licensing engineers and architects, South Dakota defines "good moral
character" as "such character as will enable a person to discharge the
fiduciary duties of an architect, engineer or land surveyor to his client
69
and to the public for the protection of health, safety and welfare."
Perhaps understanding the difficulty of defining "good moral charac-

66. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE LJ. 491, 571
(1985); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199, 1206 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (stating that the the
character requirement is so "imprecise as to be virtually unreviewable") (quoting Bayside Enterprises,
Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 707 (M.D. Ky. 1978)); Monheim, Administrative Law: Professional
and OccupationalLicensing, 44 CAL. L. REV. 403, 406 (1956) (criticizing character components as
being an imprecise standard on which to base the granting of a license).
67. CollateralConsequences, supra note 30, at 1010.
68. See, e.g., Comment, Good Moral Character and Admission to the Bar: A Constitutionally
Invalid Standard?, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 876 (1979).
69. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-18-4.1(5) (1994).
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ter," Florida decided not to define "good moral character" when it was
made a requirement for issuing a beverage license. 70 The decision not to
define the requirement left the statute open to attack as vague and
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the Florida statute was held not to be
unconstitutional for lack of definiteness in specifying the standards of
"good moral character." 7 1
On the other hand, California eliminated the problem of ambiguous
definitions of good moral character by effectively eliminating character
as a basis for the denial of most licenses. 72 Prior to 1974, California
denied occupational licenses based on, among other things, the conviction of a crime or the commission of any act involving dishonesty. 7 3 In
1974, California amended its licensing statute to provide that a license
"shall not be denied, suspended, or revoked on the grounds of lack of
good moral character or any similar ground relating to an applicant's
character, reputation, personality, or habits." 74 However, the amendment
only applies to evidence of bad moral character other than criminal
convictions. 7 5 Further, the California statute provides that no person
applying for a license "shall be required to submit to any licensing
board any attestation by other persons to his good moral character." 7 6
In the context of professional and occupational licensing, the
question of what constitutes "good moral character" has been ordinarily held to be a question of fact for the trier of fact.7 7 For over 100 years,
courts have struggled with the meaning of "good moral character"
requirement of a licensing statutes. In 1889, a Wisconsin court interpreted the "good moral character" requirement in a statute governing
admission to the bar. The court found that the term included all the
elements essential to make up such a character, among those being
common honesty and veracity. 78 The United States Supreme Court in
1957 recognized the ambiguity of good moral character by stating:

70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.15(l) (West 1987).
71. Zemour, Inc. v. State Division of Beverage, 347 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
"flWe doubt that the legislature could in its infinite wisdom detail each salient standard for good moral
character. What constitutes good moral character is a matter to be developed by the facts, evaluated
by the agency, with a judicial review of same ever available .. "Id. at 1103 (citing White v. Beary,
237 So. 2d 263,265-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
72. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 475 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 475(c) (West 1993).
75. Brandt v. Fox, 153 Cal. Rptr. 683,689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
76. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 484 (West 1990).
77. Albert v. Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm'n,
573 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Bachynsky v. State Dep't of Professional Regulation,
471 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
78. In re 0., 42 N.W. 221, 225 (Wis. 1889).
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It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for
any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences,
and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification,
which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections,
can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory
denial .... 79
In what seems to be a confusing, circular, and ill-fated attempt to
remedy the legislature's inadequate definition of "moral character"
under Florida's beverage licensing law, 80 a Florida court arrived at the
following definition: "[Good moral character is] . . . not only the
ability to distinguish between right and wrong, but the character to
observe the difference; the observance of the rules of right conduct, and
conduct which indicates and establishes the qualities generally acceptable
81
to the populace for positions of trust and confidence."
Some courts have added to the confusion by attempting to define
the concept in terms of moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is generally
defined as behavior that violates accepted moral standards of the community. 82 An Alabama court circularly defined "good moral character" to practice law as "an absence of proven conduct or acts which
have been historically considered manifestations of moral turpitude." 83
For purposes of granting a liquor license, an Illinois court defined
character as "the moral quality of a person that constitutes his intrinsic
nature ."84
In one California case, the court narrowed the application of the
good moral character requirement by stating that any defect in good
moral character must relate to fitness to engage in the licensed activity. 85
In that case, the state Department of Motor Vehicles revoked a previously issued license to sell vehicles after discovering the applicant had been
convicted of child molestation. 86 Under a 1975 version of the Vehicle
Code pertaining to the issuance of a vehicle salesperson's license, the
Department of Motor Vehicles had authority to suspend or revoke a
previously issued license even though the statute referred only to the
refusal to issue a license when the Department determined that the

79. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (footnote omitted).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN § 561.15(11) (West 1986).
81. Zemour, Inc. v. State Division of Beverage, 347 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
82. BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY 910 (5th ed. 1979).
83. Reese v. Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar, 379 So. 2d 564,569 (Ala. 1980) (quoting
Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252,263 (1957)).
84. Daley v. License Appeal Comm'n, 211 N.E.2d 573,576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
85. Brewer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 643,647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
86. Id at 648.
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applicant was not of good moral character. 87 However, there was no
evidence that the licensee's immoral character related to his fitness to
engage in the vocation of selling automobiles. 88 The revocation was
overturned on the basis that a statute could constitutionally bar a person
from practicing a lawful profession only for reasons related to fitness or
competence to practice that profession. 89 Despite the problems with
defining and applying the good moral character requirement, many
states continue to use "good moral character" as a prerequisite to
issuing various types of occupational licenses.
3.

Good Reputation Statutes

Statutes that require "good reputation" 90 or "reputable characrather than "good moral character" present a less demanding
standard to the ex-felon because they allow somewhat for the amelioration of the past felonious wrong through subsequent good conduct
and/or the rehabilitation of the ex-felon. A brief discussion of "reputation" and "character" is useful to illustrate the confusion and differences in applying the two standards.
The words "character" and "reputation" are not interchangeable.
"Reputation is that by which we are known and is the total sum of how
we are seen by others."92 It is a public definition rather than private and
refers to the general opinion of a person's character. 9 3 "A 'reputable
person' is one worthy of good repute or entitled to the esteem and
respect of good citizens generally."94
On the other hand, "character is what a man or woman is morally." 9 5 Character consists of the actual qualities which belong to an
individual. One's character is made up of small circumstances, one of
which is not being suspected of misconduct. 96 Character signifies reality
while reputation merely signifies what is accepted as reality.97 A person
ter" 9 1

87. Id. at 647.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.17(l)(a) (1995) (providing that the qualification for a real
estate license includes having a "good reputation for fair dealing").
91. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-21A-30 (1994) (providing that the character
component for a real estate license is "reputable character"); see also S. D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 3621A-7 (1994) (defining "moral turpitude").
92. Taylor v. State, 346 A.2d 718, 720 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (quoting SHAKESPEARE,
OTHELLo, act 3, sc. iii, In. 270).
93. People v. Bell, 209 N.E.2d 366,371 (11. Ct. App. 1965).
94. Jarrell v. Smith, 360 S.W.2d 825,826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (citation omitted).
95. Bay v. State Board of Education, 378 P.2d 558, 561 (Or. 1963) (citations omitted).
96. Giles v. State, 32 S.E.2d 111, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1944).
97. State v. Leabo, 249 P. 363,363 (Or. 1926).
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may have a good character but suffer from a bad reputation. 98 It may
also logically be inferred that a person may have a bad character but
enjoy a good reputation. 9 9
Like good moral character, "good reputation" is not often defined
in statutes. Perhaps this is because although reputation and character are
quite conceptual attributes, "there can be no legislative definition of
them that can automatically attach to or identify individuals possessing
them."' 0 0 Consequently, the aid of some executive or administrative
agency such as a licensing board must be invoked to evaluate applicants
as to their reputation.lO'
Although ex-felons may be disqualified from obtaining licenses
under a good moral character statute because of criminal convictions,
they may qualify under a good reputation statute. Because the exfelon's reputation, not character, is the vital factor in meeting the license
requirement, an ex-felon may have an increased ability to obtain a
license. For example, if the ex-felon has lived in a community in such a
way as to earn the respect of other citizens, or has at least not earned the
disrespect of the community, that person would logically qualify for a
license under the good reputation statutes regardless of the past conviction. In a sense, the good reputation statutes allow somewhat for the
amelioration of the felonious conduct through subsequent good conduct
or the rehabilitation of the ex-felon.
Unfortunately for the ex-felon, however, statutes that require only
good reputation are in the minority. Further, licensing statutes requiring
good reputation as a prerequisite often include a requirement for good
character.1 02 Coupling good reputation with a good character requirement essentially elevates the statute to the good moral character level
thereby making it almost impossible for the ex-felon to obtain a license.
4.

Honest and Trustworthy Statutes

The honest and trustworthy standard is another common character
component used in occupational licensing statutes. For example, Arkansas requires a real estate broker to have a good reputation for honesty,
98. Curtice v. Dixon, 68 A. 587, 589 (N.H. 1907).
99. Perhaps the confusion between good character and good reputation stems from the fact that
although a person's character cannot actually be proven by asking a witness what kind of person the
applicant is, the classic method of attempting to prove a trait of character is by proof of general
reputation in the community as to that trait. See, e.g., State v. Blake, 249 A.2d 232,235 (1968).
100. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,553 (1917).
101. Id. However, the process of evaluation in turn, may help the applicant by providing an
opportunity to present evidence of good reputation.
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. § 475.17 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (specifying that an applicant
for real estate license must be of "good character" and have a "good reputation").
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truthfulness, and fair dealing.10 3 Alabama requires an auctioneer to be
of good repute, trustworthy, and honest. 104 In Georgia, an auctioneer is
required to be trustworthy and honest. 105 A real estate broker in Mississippil0 6 and a Maryland mutual insurer 10 7 are required to be honest and
trustworthy while a Kentucky weighman is required to have a reputation
of being an honest, trustworthy, discreet, sober, and upright man. 108
Several variations of the honest and trustworthy standard are used in
licensing statutes. Sometimes the honest and trustworthy standard is
used alone. However, honest and trustworthy is often used in conjunction with good character or good reputation. 10 9
For example, an
Alabama110 and Kansas111 real estate agent and an embalmer in Arizona 1 12 are required to be honest and trustworthy and have a good reputation.
Coupling honest and trustworthy with a good reputation or good
character requirement again elevates the statute to the good moral
character level thereby making it almost impossible for the ex-felon to
obtain a license. However, both standards, the good reputation and the
honest and trustworthy standard, present about the same degree of
difficulty because they are both typically gauged by a person's reputation.
B.

CHARACTER COMPoNENTs OF

BusINESS FORMS

The character component of occupational licensing laws applies not
only to ex-felons in their individual capacity, but can also apply to
preclude the grant of a license to a business form in which the ex-felon
has an ownership interest. This can preclude an ex-felon from pursuing
certain businesses in association with others. For example, the disqualification for lack of good moral character is often extended to corporations and partnerships by precluding parties with a criminal conviction
from having both a direct or indirect interest in the business obtaining a

103. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-35-302 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993).
104. ALA. CODE § 34-4-21 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
105. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-6-11 (1993).
106. MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-35-9 (1989).
107. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS § 6-505 (1993).
108. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352.530 (1992) (making no provision for "weighwoman").
109. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 45, para. 3-206 (1993) (providing that a nurse's aid must be honest and
trustworthy and have good moral character).
110. ALA. CODE § 34-27-33 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
111. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3039 (1993).
112. ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1333 (1986).
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license.1 1 3 State laws concerning the issuance of permits for selling
alcoholic beverages illustrate the preclusion.
In California, a partnership application for an on-sale general liquor
license can be denied if one of the partners is unable to qualify because
that partner possesses a criminal conviction. 1 14 In Minnesota, licenses
for the sale of non-intoxicating malt liquor may not be issued to a
partner of a person with prior criminal convictions.' 1 5 Similarly, an
applicant for a liquor license in South Dakota must be of good moral
character and if the licensee is "a corporation, the managing officers
thereof must have like qualifications."11 6 Florida will not issue a liquor
license to a corporation in which any of its officers were convicted of a
felony in the past fifteen years."l 7
As the above cases indicate, licensing laws affect an ex-felon's
ability to pursue an employment and business opportunity on an individual level and in association with others. Thus licensing laws can have
a far reaching impact on an ex-felon's pursuit of particular employment
opportunities.
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS

The far-reaching impact that licensing laws can have on an exfelon's ability to pursue private employment and a chosen occupation
raises questions as to whether such laws violate equal protection or due
process, or are unconstitutionally vague."i 8
Under equal protection analysis, governmental actions that impact a
fundamental right or a suspect class generally undergo a "strict scrutiny" test and are upheld only if there is a "compelling" or "overrid113. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.29(A) (1989 & Supp. 1993) ("No person heretofore
convicted of any felony shall receive or be permitted to retain any permit; nor shall such person have
an interest, directly or indirectly, in any permit.").
114. Coletti v. State Bd.of Equalization, 209 P.2d 984,986 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
115. Minn. Op. Att'y. Gen. 217-B-5 (June 8, 1953). Minnesota also precludes issuing a liquor
license to a person who had a liquor license revoked during the previous five years or to any person
who at the time a license was revoked owned an interest of more than five percent in the business,
corporation, partnership, association, enterprise, or firm. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.402 (West
1990 & Supp. 1995).
116. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-6.2 (1992).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.15(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). However, under Florida law if a
corporation has been unable to qualify for an alcoholic beverage license because it had been
convicted of an unrelated felony conviction, the conviction will not constitute an absolute bar if the
corporation has terminated its relationship with any director, officer, employee, or controlling
shareholder whose action directly contributed to the conviction. Id. § 561.15(4).
118. See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (endorsing the right to obtain
employment by stating that, "The right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property'
concepts of the Fifth Amendment.") But see Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954)
(holding that a six-month suspension from practice of a physician because he had been convicted of
failing to produce subpoenaed papers did not violate the Constitution).
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ing" legitimate state purpose.1 9 However, the pursuit of a particular
occupation is not a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection. 120 Further, convicted felons are not considered a suspect class
unless a state statute specifically provides for protection.121 Instead, the
United States Supreme Court applies the "rational basis" test to licensing statutes. 12 2 This less stringent test requires only that occupational
licensing statutes bear some "rational relationship" to a conceivable
legitimate state purpose.1 23 The "rational relationship" requirement is
much more difficult to challenge on equal protection grounds.
Nonetheless, constitutional challenges to statutes that involve a
blanket denial of an occupational license to convicted felons have met
with some success. 124 Courts have reasoned that such statutes are not
reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose because some felonies
are unrelated to a governmental interest in trustworthiness. 125 However,
statutes that "reasonably relate" the nature of the prior conviction to the
26
qualifications or duties of the occupation are constitutionally valid.1
Some license applicants have unsuccessfully argued that licensing
statutes violate due process by making a criminal conviction an automatic disqualification and thereby creating an irrebuttable presumption of
unfitness.12 7 The applicants argue that they are not given the opportuni-

119. Horton v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 339, 343 (W.D. Va. 1979).
120. Thomas v. Board of Examiners, Chicago Public Schools, 651 F. Supp 664, 671 (N.D. I11.
1986). See also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that a
Massachusetts statute making it mandatory for a uniformed police officer to retire at age 50 does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
121. Thomas, 651 F. Supp at 671. See also, Furst v. New York City Transit Authority, 631 F.
Supp. 1331, 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (following Murgia in stating that because public employment is not
a fundamental right and ex-felons are not a substitute class, the policy need only be rationally related
to a legitimate state goal to pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
122. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970).
123. Id. at 487.
124. See Brewer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(reversing the denial of a license to sell vehicles); Furst v. New York City Transit Authority 631 F.
Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (reversing the denial of city employment to a convicted felon); Butts v.
Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding that prohibiting convicted felons from occupying
state civil service positions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause); Newland v. Board of Governors, 566 P.2d 254 (1977) (reversing the denial of teacher's
credentials to people who have been convicted of misdemeanors).
125. Lopez v. McMahon, 253 Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (denying a child care
license to an individual who resided with an ex-felon).
126. Id. at 324; Pieri v. Fox, 158 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1979) (refusing to deny a real estate broker's
license); Brandt v. Fox, 153 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to deny a license to a real
estate salesperson).
127. E.g.. Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Miller v. Carter,
547 F.2d 1314, 1318 (7th Cir. 1977) (declining to say whether the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
analysis was appropriate for this case), affd, 434 U.S. 356 (1978) (per curiam).
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ty to present evidence of fitness and are deprived of due process. 128
However, courts have rejected this argument.
Occupational licensing statutes have also been challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague. The United States Supreme Court has held
that noncriminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague if "'[people] of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning."' 129 In a Montana case, 130 an individual was denied a liquor license
because of a criminal conviction. The statute on which the denial was
based did not specifically state that a criminal conviction was a disqualifying factor.131 The individual argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not describe prohibited conduct sufficiently
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice. The Montana court
disagreed and reasoned that a legislature could not be expected to detail
each salient standard for "good moral character" because what constitutes good moral character is a matter to be developed by facts, evaluated
by an agency, and reviewed by a court. 132 The United States Supreme
Court has also dismissed vagueness challenges to moral character requirements on the theory that "long usage" has given "well defined
contours" to the moral character requirement.1 33
The constitutional challenges to occupational licensing laws have
generally not been successful. Consequently, the ex-felon remains
confronted with the barrier to employment caused by licensing statutes
that continue to embrace a variety of character components.
IV. REDUCING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BARRIERS TO THE
EX-FELON
Recent legislation mandating tougher prison sentences for repeat
offenders is expected to significantly increase the prison population and

128. Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1044 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that as long as a
classification is rationally related to legitimate state objectives, it may not be attacked on due process
grounds by labeling the rule an irrebuttable presumption) (citing Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 667 F.2d 524,534 (6th Cir. 1981)).
129. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,607 (1973) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
130. Broers v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 773 P.2d 320 (Mont. 1989).
131. Id.at 322-23.
132. Id. at 323. But see, e.g., Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199, 1206 (C.D. 111.1979)
(finding the character requirement so imprecise as to be virtually unreviewable) (quoting Bayside
Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 706 (M.D. Ky. 1978)); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (finding further inconsistencies in application of the standard presents
problems in providing adequate notice of what conduct constitutes lack of good character).
133. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971)
(focusing on character requirements for becoming an attorney).
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the cost to society. 134 States must renew their efforts to counter the
expected increase in the prison population by decreasing the recidivism
rate. A successful societal effort to decrease recidivism must include a
system that makes available a wide variety of employment opportunities
to ex-offenders upon release while protecting the safety, health, and
welfare of society.1 35 One method to facilitate the employment of exfelons is for states to reduce the employment barriers caused by existing
occupational licensing laws.
Legislative, administrative, and judicial actions to remove or modify
restrictions on the occupational licensing of ex-felons must operate to
"deconstruct" the relationship between convictions, character, and
occupational licensing statutes. This "deconstruction" can be accomplished by establishing the following policy: (1) make a "direct relationship" requirement an explicit provision of occupational licensing
statutes; (2) require consideration of mitigating and rehabilitative factors;
and (3) counter licensing restrictions by placing occupational licensing
provisions in anti-discrimination and fair employment statutes.
A.

MAKE A "DIRECT RELATIONSHIP" REQUIREMENT AN EXPLICIT
PROVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING STATUTES

States should amend statutes to explicitly require that a particular
license can be denied only if there is a "direct" or "substantial"
relationship between a prior conviction and the occupation to be licensed. Expressly mandating a direct relationship between the employment activity and the offense committed serves the dual purpose of
36
promoting employment opportunities and protecting the public.
California has implemented the direct relationship requirement in
licensing statutes. Under California law, applicants for real estate and
liquor licenses can be denied a license if they have been convicted of a
crime or have done any act involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit with
intent to benefit themselves. 137 However, California limits those denials
to circumstances where the conviction is substantially related to the
qualifications, functions, or duties of the business or profession to be
134. For example, California planned 12 prisons for construction at a cost of $3-$4 billion prior to
passing its "Three Strikes, You're Out" legislation. To allow for the increase in the number of
prisoners because of the legislation, 41 new prisons will be needed by the year 2003 at an estimated
construction cost of $10.2 billion. The estimated minimum annual cost of operating the prisons in 2003
is $6.8 billion. Three Strikes... and You're In, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1994, at 74.
135. See Potuto, supra note 9, at 81.
136. This approach was taken by the Special Committee to Draft the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act. See Potuto, supra note 9, at 88.
137. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 481 (West 1990) (stating that various criteria should be
considered in denying, suspending or revoking a license in order to ensure that the previously
committed crime or act was substantially related to the qualifications of the regulated profession).
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regulated.1 38 This specific provision takes precedence over any other
general provision that would otherwise deny a license on the basis of a
139
criminal conviction.
B.

REQUIRE CONSIDERATION OF MITIGATING AND REHABILITATIVE

FACTORS

Legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies must consider
factors that operate to mitigate a felony conviction. Optimal implementation of the mitigation requirements could be achieved by specifying
mitigating factors, such as the effect of pardons and clemency, in statutes. Whether statutorily expressed or not, such mitigating factors
should be considered by courts and administrative agencies.
An example of the use of mitigating factors was illustrated in a
District of Columbia case regarding the suitability of ex-felons for
admission to practice law. The District of Columbia court considered
eleven factors for assessing rehabilitation and the moral fitness of the
applicant. 14 0 These factors are general enough to be applied to an exfelon in most occupational licensing situations. The factors are:
1. The nature and character of the offenses committed.
2. The number and duration of offenses.
3. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses
were committed.
4. The social and historical context in which the offenses were
committed.
5. The sufficiency of the punishment undergone and restitution made in connection with the offenses.
6. The grant or denial of a pardon for offenses committed.
7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense
was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct
during that period.
8. The applicant's current attitude about the prior offenses
(e.g., acceptance of responsibility for and renunciation of past
wrongdoing, and remorse).
9. The applicant's candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the
filings and proceedings on character and fitness.
10. The applicant's constructive activities and accomplishments
subsequent to the criminal convictions.

138. Id.
139. Brandt v. Fox, 153 Cal. Rptr. 683,686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
140. In re Daniel E. Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1133 n.4 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988).
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11. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's
moral fitness.
Making no distinction between applicants who have been convicted
of a felony and those who have not, the District of Columbia court stated
that applicants need to prove their qualifications and fitness by a preponderance of the evidence.1 4 1 However, the court recognized that serious
misconduct required a greater showing of rehabilitation and that in the
case of extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation
may be virtually impossible to make. 142
Evidence of a full rehabilitation should be allowed to completely
overcome a disqualification for a criminal conviction. For example,
California will not allow a criminal conviction to disqualify an individual
for certain licenses if that individual obtains a certificate of rehabilitation. 14 3 Under the California law, even if the crime relates to the occupation being licensed the licensing board must consider and evaluate all
competent evidence of rehabilitation. 144
Pardons, clemency, or convictions that have been annulled or
expunged should operate to completely eliminate the effect of a prior
conviction for purposes of occupational licensing laws. In California, a
full pardon returns to the convicted person all the rights, privileges, and
franchises of which she or he had been deprived as a consequence of
that conviction.1 45 In Florida, a full and unconditional pardon removes
the absolute bar to receiving an alcoholic beverage license. 146 However,
the licensing board can still take into account circumstances surrounding
the prior conviction in determining an applicant's suitability for a
license. 147
C.

INCORPORATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING PROVISIONS IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT STATUTES

Wisconsin, Hawaii, and New York have anti-discrimination statutes
that prohibit employment and licensing discrimination based on criminal
convictions. 148 The "goal of [these] statutes is to reduce recidivism by

141. Id. at 1134 n.7.
142. Id.
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 482 (West 1990).
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4853 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
146. 59 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 160 (1959).
147. G.W. Liquors of Collier, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 556 So. 2d 464, 465
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See also Gary L. Hall, Annotation, Pardon as Restoring Public Office or
License or Eligibility Therefor, 58 A.L.R. 3d 1191 (1974) (summarizing various approaches taken by
courts that have addressed this issue).
148. Meyers, supra note 9, at 895.
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encouraging the gainful employment of [ex-felons] without mandating
any form of favoritism toward them." 14 9 All three states prohibit
criminal record-based discrimination by any employer, whether public
or private. 15 0 The statutes provide a mechanism for protecting the public
interest and welfare by permitting a licensing agency to consider a
conviction if it "substantially relates" or "directly relates" to the
circumstances of the particular job.
The New York statute is unique in that it requires consideration of
"specific factors" when a question arises under the "direct relationship" exception.151 These factors provide further guidance to a licensing agency for purposes of processing license applications by ex-felons.
These factors are the expressed public policy of encouraging
the licensure and employment of convicted offenders, [and
considering] the responsibilities necessarily related to the job
or licensed activity, the bearing the offense(s) may have upon
performance of those responsibilities, the time that has elapsed
since the offense(s), the age of the person at the time the
offense or offenses were committed, the seriousness of the
offense(s), the efforts of the individual toward rehabilitation,
and the interest of the employer in protecting the property and
welfare of the employer itself, specific individuals or the
general public. 152
V.

CONCLUSION
The United States continues to be addicted to imprisonment as the
solution to crime and violence. However, the economic and social costs
of maintaining large prison populations are substantial. Recidivists make
up a substantial percentage of the prison population. Research has
shown that employment and the recidivism rate are inversely related.
Therefore, by facilitating the employment of ex-felons, the number of
recidivists will be reduced thereby reducing the overall prison population.
A proliferation in occupational licensing has resulted in a license
requirement for a substantial number of skilled and unskilled employment opportunities. These, occupational licenses generally contain both
149. Id.
150. Id. (finding that several other states have enacted similar legislation covering only public
sector employment and licensing decisions). See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 364.03 (1988); WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 9.96A.101-.050 (1988).
151. Meyers, supra note 9, at 896.
152. N.Y. CORRECr. § 753 (West 1987) (summarizing factors for licensing agencies to consider
in determination).
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a competency and a character component. Although the ex-felon can
achieve the necessary competency level, the character component acts as
a significant obstacle to obtaining a license and employment. Some
states have implemented statutes and procedures to ameliorate the impact
of a criminal conviction in obtaining licenses. The statutes and procedures take into consideration how the offense relates to the licensed
occupation, the length of time between the conviction and the license
application, and other factors showing rehabilitation. However, a substantial number of state statutes and procedures do not provide for such
amelioration. In order to facilitate the employment of ex-felons and
thereby reduce recidivism, states must undergo a review of their licensing
statutes and procedures with the dual goal of facilitating employment for
the ex-felon and protecting the safety, health, and welfare of society. In
undergoing this review, states must implement changes to "deconstruct"
the relationship between convictions, character, and occupational licensing statutes by a policy of giving full effect to a "direct relationship"
test and by allowing consideration of mitigating and rehabilitative factors
in occupational licensing statutes.

